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Review Article: One Time, Many Times  
 
Abstract 
This review article surveys recent work on time and temporality in international 
relations. It begins with an overview of Kimberly Hutchings’s influential history 
of ideas exploring the relationship between chronos (quantitative experience of 
time) and kairos (qualitative conceptualisation of time). Building on the 
architecture of Hutchings’s argument, it surveys more recent scholarship that 
supplements, extends and complicates her insights in two ways. First, while 
Hutchings focuses on the way in which theorisations of kairos shift over time, the 
development of a unified global chronotic imaginary was itself a contested 
process, frequently interrupted by kairotic considerations. Second, while 
Hutchings is interested in western conceptualisations of kairos, recent work has 
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Although it was published ten years ago, Kimberly Hutchings’s Time and world 
politics remains a key reference for thinking about time and temporality in 
international relations.1 Working through the canon of Western political thought 
on questions of time, Hutchings reveals how assumptions about time have 
played a significant role in shaping the analysis and normative judgment of what 
is happening and will happen in world politics. Early in her book, Hutchings 
outlines two ways in which social life is temporalized—as ‘chronos’, which 
conceives of time as a quantitatively infinite, divisible medium within which life 
                                                        
1 Kimberly Hutchings, Time and world politics: Thinking the present (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2008). 
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is lived, and as ‘kairos’, in which a qualitative event is seen to create, arrest or 
change time rather than simply endure it.2 It is kairos that allows us to see 
history as not simply ‘one damn thing after another’, but as endowed with a 
trajectory and purpose. Enlightenment thinkers of the eighteenth century 
detached kairos from other worldly sources such as God and nature, placing it 
firmly in human hands. From here on, Western theorisations of time would be 
preoccupied with discerning the direction of human temporality and the 
mechanisms that drove it, and with the question of whether kairotic purpose 
was unified or plural.3 
 
In this review article, I offer a brief overview of Hutchings’s argument as a point 
of departure for a survey of more recent work on time in international relations 
that supplements, extends and complicates her insights in two ways. First, while 
Hutchings is concerned with the way in which theorisations of kairos shift over 
time, I read some of this work as suggesting that the development of a unified 
global chronotic imaginary was also a deeply contested process, frequently 
interrupted by kairotic considerations. Second, while Hutchings is interested in 
western conceptualisations of kairos, more recent work has shifted the analytical 
focus to those subject positions marginalised by such kairotic imaginaries. 
 
Once upon a time  
 
                                                        
2 Ibid., 5.  
3 Ibid., 36.  
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Notwithstanding significant differences in their views of the ‘mechanisms’ or 
motors of history, Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant, Hegel and Marx 
converged in regarding kairos in singular and unified terms. With few 
exceptions,4 human cultural plurality was subsumed into a temporal singularity. 
The key figure here is Hegel, for whom different cultures were representative of 
different stages in world history. In a move that mapped time onto space, Africa 
was conceptualised as Europe’s past and Europe as everyone’s future, furnishing 
the ideological justification for imperial civilising missions. Hutchings traces the 
inheritance of these premises by post-Kantian and post-Marxist critical theorists 
(Habermas, Linklater, Benhabib, Hardt and Negri) who, for all their post-ness, 
continue to make sense of chronos through kairotic narratives wedded to 
progress and unity. This is not because they see progress as inevitable; rather, 
such a tendency is underpinned by the Kantian belief that progress can be 
hastened through the intervention of the theorist, insistent that such progress is 
realisable—a vision of theory as potentially self-fulfilling prophecy. As Hutchings 
points out, the temporality of such narratives is invariably captured in retrospect 
from a globalised capitalist modern present, which is interpreted as increasingly 
shared and towards which world politics is seen to have been evolving.5 
Crucially, Hutchings sees even more pessimistic anti-historicists (Virilio, 
Agamben) as offering a unified conception of world-political time which is 
conflated with the time of late capitalist western modernity, out of which their 
apocalyptic visions of futurity are drawn.6 
 
                                                        
4 See Sankar Muthu’s reading of Herder in Enlightenment Against Empire (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003).  
5 Hutchings, Time and world politics, 125.  
6 Ibid., 152.  
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It is in opposition to the monolithic theorisation of world political time by the 
overwhelming weight of western political thought that the critical potential of 
postcolonial,7 feminist8—and one might add queer9—theory becomes evident. 
For Hutchings, these interventions undermine the notion that world political 
time can be theorised in homogeneous and unified terms, or indeed that 
theoretical interventions can be timely in the sense of ‘reading’ the present and 
intervening in it in ways that redirect the arrow of time. Having devoted most of 
her book to canonical theorisations of time, Hutchings can do little more than 
gesture at the ways in which postcolonial and poststructuralist work offers ways 
of making sense of the temporal plurality of the present by recognising the 
‘contingent and ongoing cross-contamination of different temporal orderings’.10 
Still, it undertakes an immensely valuable provincialising exercise, making space 
for further work that might illuminate what is at stake in thinking about the 
temporal plurality of the present. 
 
If Hutchings organises her discussion of temporality by thinker, other 
approaches have centred concepts. Thus, contributors to the edited collection 
Time, Temporality and Global Politics take as their objective the reframing in 
temporal terms of key concepts in IR such as war, security, identity and 
                                                        
7 Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).  
8 Julia Kristeva, ‘Women’s Time’, Signs 7, no. 1 (1981): 13-35; Victoria Browne, Feminism, Time, 
and Nonlinear History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).  
9 Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2004); Heather Love, Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2007); José Esteban Muñoz, Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of 
Queer Futurity (New York: New York University Press, 2009); Elizabeth Freeman, Time Binds: 
Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010). 
10 Hutchings, Time and world politics, 172.  
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inequality. It is impossible to do justice to the range of insights generated in an 
article of this length, so I shall offer only one set of examples here.  
 
In their contribution to this volume, Andrew Hom and Ty Solomon offer a view of 
identity as a temporal formation. In prior work, Solomon has drawn on Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory to show how the subject is constructed through a 
retroactive temporality, wherein it posits itself as ‘having always been’—that is, 
as having had a stable essence in the past from which future action follows. Yet 
this is a fantasy because the subject is always marked by incompleteness 
deriving from an anxiety about ‘not having fully been’ in the past and ‘not quite 
yet being’ in the future. As Lacan puts it, the subject only ever ‘will have been’ 
since it never reaches the image of wholeness that it strives towards in its 
practices of identity formation.11 Applied to a scenario in international politics 
such as the ‘War on Terror’, Hom and Solomon describe how the ‘America’ that 
was purportedly lost after the attacks of ‘9/11’ had never fully existed: rather, 
the retroactive presupposition of this ideal drove the desire for it and furnished 
the ideological justification for bringing into being something that the nation 
fantasised as already having existed and been lost.12 Shahzad Bashir offers an 
analogous reading of ISIS in his chapter in this volume. Bashir argues against 
taking ISIS rhetoric of an unmediated return to an earlier Islamic era at face 
value, demonstrating how the movement’s contemporary predicament shapes its 
projections about the past. In his reading, this is ‘a past constructed in the image 
                                                        
11 Andrew R. Hom and Ty Solomon, ‘Timing, Identity, and Emotion in International Relations’, in 
Time, Temporality and Global Politics, eds. Andrew Hom, Christopher McIntosh, Alasdair McKay, 
and Liam Stockdale (Bristol: E-International Relations, 2016), 24-5.  
12 Ibid., 28-9.  
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of the future rather than the other way around.’13 Such temporal deconstructive 
readings open up for scrutiny and contestation the ubiquitous practice of 
deploying identity, history and memory as justification for the manifold 
violences of the present.   
 
Chronos and its discontents  
 
Critical theorists have tended to be more interested in debates over kairos that 
battle over the direction, mechanisms and purpose of history. Yet as Vanessa 
Ogle’s The Global Transformation of Time makes clear, the production of 
universal chronotic time has also been politically contested and frequently 
interrupted by what we might think of as kairotic considerations. Time 
unification entailed the abolition of local solar times in favour of countrywide 
mean times, which were in turn organised into twenty-four hour-wide time 
zones, as well as the spread of the Gregorian calendar to the non-Western 
world.14 Revisiting E. P. Thompson’s claim that the shift from a natural ‘concrete’ 
time told in accordance with the movement of the sun and seasons to an 
‘abstract’ clock time occurred sometime in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century with the advent of factory work, Ogle demonstrates that this 
shift was more arduous, prolonged and belated than commonly supposed, 
remaining incomplete and contested well into the early twentieth century.15 
What interests me about her book is less the accounts of the initiatives and 
                                                        
13 Shahzad Bashir, ‘Islam and the Politics of Temporality: The Case of ISIS’, in Time, Temporality 
and Global Politics, eds. Hom et al., 143.   
14 Vanessa Ogle, The Global Transformation of Time 1870-1950 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2015).  
15 Ibid., 10, 48-9.  
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motivations of time unification entrepreneurs, than the story of how their efforts 
were received by ordinary people in a range of different contexts.   
 
Two snapshots are illustrative. British proposals for daylight saving were 
fiercely contested when first made in 1908. While proponents typically advanced 
justifications rooted in concerns about public health and temperance (pubs were 
thought to be busier after dark), objections were grounded in a libertarian 
antipathy to what appeared to many to be a state ‘nudge’ in favour of compulsory 
early rising as well as anxieties about the impact of daylight saving on particular 
forms of life and work. Agricultural interests were especially vociferous in their 
opposition, arguing that their work was irrevocably tied to the rhythms of nature 
and that changing the clocks would force workers to labour in the dark. While 
daylight saving was first implemented in 1916 in the exceptional circumstances 
of World War One as an energy conservation measure, it was only in 1925 that it 
became institutionalised in law. Ogle’s reading of the daylight saving debates 
leads her to conclude that even in the heart of the imperial metropole and even 
at this relatively advanced moment in the march of industrial capitalism, many 
people strained to imagine an abstract time unchained from nature.16  
 
Time standardisation was equally fraught in the colonies for reasons that are not 
difficult to fathom. The first moves towards time unification in the Indian 
subcontinent came in 1870 when railway lines from hubs in Bombay, Calcutta 
and Madras began to link up. At this point, the railways began to run on Madras 
time, Madras being located on the meridian that roughly bifurcated the country 
                                                        
16 Ibid., 63.  
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and also being the site of the only government observatory that could establish 
time precisely. This meant that residents of Bombay lived in two concurrent 
times, a local solar time for most purposes, and Madras time (half an hour ahead) 
when they needed to catch a train. An 1881 proposal by the Governor of Bombay 
to simplify matters by shifting to Madras time for all purposes provoked uproar. 
Protesters objected to the lack of consultation, the disruption of prayer times, 
and the inconvenience of having half an hour less between sunrise and the 
commencement of work, thus attesting to the continued salience of natural time 
even after urbanisation.17 A 1905 attempt to draw Bombay into a new Indian 
Standard Time proved no more successful, unhelpfully coinciding as it did with 
the Viceroy’s deeply unpopular partition of Bengal: adherence to Bombay Time 
now became a mark of nationalist pride.18 As late as 1950, the city’s dual 
temporality was marked by the discrepancy between the clock crowning the 
Victoria Terminus train station, which displayed Standard Time, and those in the 
municipal corporation building across the road, which followed Bombay Time.19 
 
Thus, far from being driven straightforwardly by the global interconnectedness 
forged through improved transport and communication, the effort to develop a 
globally unified chronotic imaginary was frequently interrupted by kairotic 
preoccupations with identity, freedom and power. Nowhere is this clearer than 
in efforts to ‘improve’ the Gregorian calendar by equalising the lengths of 
months, fixing the association between dates and weekdays and stabilising the 
timing of Easter. Pushed primarily by business interests citing the consequent 
                                                        
17 Jim Masselos, ‘Bombay Time’, in Intersections: Socio-Cultural Trends in Maharashtra, ed. Meera 
Kosambi (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 2000), 167-8. 
18 Ogle, The Global Transformation of Time, 118.  
19 Masselos, ‘Bombay Time’, 179; Ogle, The Global Transformation of Time, 117. 
 10 
advantages for ease of accounting, Ogle explains how these proposals were 
successfully rejected by religious groups across denominations, who viewed 
them as encroaching on religious territory on account of their temporal 
dislocation of days of religious observance.20 Ironically, parallel initiatives 
around Islamic calendar reform with a view to harmonising the temporal 
observance of Ramadan were provoked, aided and complicated by secular 
developments such as the invention of telegraphy, attesting to a mutual 
contamination of the religious and the secular in the re-imagination of calendar 
time.21 Pace critical theoretic proclamations of the advent of secular, 
homogeneous time, Ogle’s account of the defeat of Gregorian calendar 
rationalisation initiatives makes me wonder, paraphrasing Bruno Latour, 
whether we have ever been secular.  
 
Kairos and its discontents 
 
What are the implications of thinking about kairos in singular and unified terms, 
and of conflating it with the time of western modernity? More importantly, once 
we have provincialised this mode of thinking, what alternative temporalities are 
made visible and how might they matter politically? Introducing a special issue 
on Decolonial Temporalities, Narendran Kumarakulasingam reiterates the 
familiar view of the colonial experience as a temporal encounter in which 
European thinkers relegated contemporaneous non-European others to bygone 
times—a move that Johannes Fabian famously described as the ‘denial of 
                                                        
20 Ogle, The Global Transformation of Time, 200.  
21 Ibid., chapter 6.  
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coevalness’.22 Yet Kumarakulasingam also insists that colonial temporality was 
never entirely successful at displacing other ways of relating to time.23 This is not 
to deny its power; instead it seems to imply, following Ranajit Guha, that colonial 
temporality is dominant without being hegemonic.24 This opens up the question 
of what these ‘other ways’ might be and the possibility that recuperating them 
might be ‘pivotal to political projects interested in rupturing a present whose 
inflection is violence and fatalism’, as suggested by Anna Agathangelou and Kyle 
Killian in the introduction to their magnificent collection Time, Temporality and 
Violence in International Relations.25 A number of contributors to these two 
volumes address the time question from the perspective of a range of 
marginalised experiences—enslavement, indigeneity, untouchability, 
colonisation, statelessness, migrancy, homelessness, childhood—examining not 
only how subjects in these locations are placed behind or outside time, but also 
how they ‘defied, deflected and appropriated’26 their temporal emplacement. 
Again, a comprehensive survey of these rich contributions is beyond the scope of 
this article, so I will be selective in the discussion that follows.  
 
To ask ‘what is the time of slavery?’, as a number of contributors do, is to wonder 
about the duration of the condition of enslavement. While their reflections 
                                                        
22 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2014), 31. 
23 Narendran Kumarakulasingam, ‘Introduction’, in Decolonial Temporalities: Plural Pasts, 
Irreducible Presents, and Open Futures, ed. Narendran Kumarakulasingam, Contexto Internacional 
38, no. 3 (2016): 755.   
24 Ranajit Guha, Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).  
25 Anna M. Agathangelou and Kyle D. Killian, ‘Introduction: Of time and temporality in world 
politics’, in Time, Temporality and Violence in International Relations: (De)fatalizing the present, 
forging radical alternatives, eds. Anna M. Agathangelou and Kyle D. Killian (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2017), 1.  
26 Kumarakulasingam, ‘Introduction’, 758.  
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largely meditate on the African American experience, I want to come at the 
question from the vantage point of a melancholic postcolonial Britain.27 Reading 
British parliamentary debates on the occasion of the 2007 bicentennial of the 
abolition of slavery, it becomes evident that for many speakers, slavery ended 
with abolition—a view that is expressed so vociferously that some critics have 
read the debates as an exercise in ‘remembering the abolition, forgetting the 
“trade”’.28 Yet the haunting afterlives of slavery are everywhere in contemporary 
Britain.  
 
In the wake of the 1993 racially motivated murder of black British teenager 
Stephen Lawrence—a seismic event in the racial politics of contemporary 
Britain—a public inquiry headed by Sir William Macpherson concluded that the 
Metropolitan Police Service was ‘institutionally racist’. Macpherson is descended 
from another William Macpherson, a man who around 1800 journeyed to the 
West Indies, purchased slaves and entered into a relationship with an enslaved 
woman with whom he fathered a number of children (they would be denied the 
Macpherson name, becoming known as Williams). As Catherine Hall remarks in a 
review of a recent book on mixed-race Jamaicans in Britain, in delivering his 
indictment of the police, Sir William ‘knew his family’s history well.’ ‘Who can 
say’, she muses, ‘what part those imperial hauntings played in his understanding 
of the many failures attending the death of Stephen Lawrence?’29 Saidiya 
Hartman could well be speaking of Lawrence or indeed countless others whose 
black lives patently do not matter to white supremacists when she says ‘I, too, 
                                                        
27 Paul Gilroy, After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture? (London: Routledge, 2004).  
28 Emma Waterton, ‘Humiliated silence: multiculturalism, blame, and the trope of “moving on”’, 
Museum and Society 8, no. 3 (2010), 131.  
29 Catherine Hall, ‘Persons outside the law’, London Review of Books 40, no. 14 (2018), 5. 
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live in the time of slavery, by which I mean I am living in the future created by it. 
It is the ongoing crisis of citizenship… If the ghost of slavery still haunts our 
present, it is because we are still looking for an exit from the prison.’30 To say 
this, she clarifies elsewhere, ‘is not to deny the abolition of slavery or to assert 
the identity or continuity of racism over the course of centuries, but rather to 
consider the constitutive nature of loss in the making of the African diaspora’. It 
is to recognise that ‘the “time of slavery” negates the common sense intuition of 
time as continuity or progression, then and now coexist; we are coeval with the 
dead.’31 Jared Sexton argues that a necessary implication of this recognition of 
coevalness is that ‘slavery must be theorized maximally, in ways that rupture 
dominant understandings of time and its contingent relations of power, if its 
abolition is to reach the proper level.’32 
 
What is the time of indigeneity? As Kumarakulasingam and Mvuselelo Ngcoya 
point out, indigeneity has emerged as an important category that promises 
restitution, justice and equality to indigenous groups based on claims of prior 
occupancy of territory, self-identification, marginalisation and a commitment to 
the preservation of identity and custom. Yet the invocation of this category in 
postcolonial South Africa has been complicated, by its deployment against 
groups that have been co-sufferers under white settler colonialism, and by its 
appropriation by the descendants of settlers in everyday practices such as the 
                                                        
30 Cited from Anna M. Agathangelou and Kyle D. Killian, ‘International relations as a vulnerable 
space: A conversation with Fanon and Hartman about temporality and violence’, in Time, 
Temporality and Violence in International Relations, eds. Agathangelou and Killian, 30.  
31 Saidiya Hartman, ‘The Time of Slavery’, The South Atlantic Quarterly 101, no. 4 (2002), 758-9.  
32 Jared Sexton, ‘The social life of social death: On afro-pessimism and black optimism’, in Time, 
Temporality and Violence in International Relations, eds. Agathangelou and Killian, 71 (citations 
omitted).  
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cultivation of ‘indigenous’ plants as a way of aestheticizing properties and 
consolidating their anxious belonging (‘putting down roots’) in the post-
apartheid state.33 Other contributors similarly gesture at the potentials and 
pitfalls of the category of indigeneity. For João Nackle Urt, ‘indigeneity’ is an 
exogenous and generic term imposed on a range of colonised groups as a way of 
denying them contemporaneity with the coloniser.34 Wanda Nanibush is critical 
of what she calls ‘salvage ethnography’ for its tendency to overemphasise 
tradition as a marker of authentic indigeneity and its denial of indigenous agency 
in the making of other modernities.35 Kumarakulasingam and Ngcoya are 
illuminating in gesturing beyond these restrictive conceptions to alternative 
ways of inhabiting indigeneity. In an exemplary instance of decolonial scholarly 
praxis, in dialogue with an elderly farmer in KwaZulu Natal named Gogo Qho, 
they offer readers a glimpse of alternative human relationships with the 
botanical world—ones that are guided as much by conversations with ancestors 
as by tradition, experience and scientific knowledge. This suggests to them that 
the past ‘is not an objectified archive waiting to be exhibited or plumbed by the 
professional knowledge dispenser or the bureaucrat, but rather… is in dialogue 
with the self.’36  
 
A number of contributors hint at possibilities for self- and world-making that 
lurk in the timespaces external to the chrononormativity of state and market in 
                                                        
33 Narendran Kumarakulasingam and Mvuselelo Ngcoya, ‘Plant Provocations: Botanical 
Indigeneity and (De)colonial Imaginations’, Contexto Internacional 38, no. 3 (2016), 843-64.  
34 João Nackle Urt, ‘How Western Sovereignty Occludes Indigenous Governance: the Guarani and 
Kaiowa Peoples in Brazil’, Contexto Internacional 38, no. 3 (2016), 879.  
35 Wanda Nanibush, ‘Outside of time: Salvage ethnography, self-representation and performing 
culture’, in Time, Temporality and Violence in International Relations, eds. Agathangelou and 
Killian, 104-118. 
36 Kumarakulasingam and Ngcoya, ‘Plant Provocations’, 856.  
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which marginalised subjects typically find themselves. Drawing on work with 
migrant day labourers in Seattle and Portland, Paul Apostolidis describes how 
the erratic temporalities of casualised labour expose workers to violence and 
injury, but also, out of sheer necessity, engender temporally experimental modes 
of living. Denied the relative stability enjoyed by insourced workers, the 
precarity of day labourers makes them more able to discern alternatives to 
neoliberal temporalities and more willing to join political initiatives that struggle 
towards them. More than a speculative philosophical argument, this claim is 
grounded in ethnographic observation of how worker community centres ‘bend 
the dominant flow of workers’ waiting time, interrupting its violent trajectories 
and turning it toward distinctly anti-neoliberal endeavors’.37 Ritu Vij makes a 
similar move in her reading of homelessness in contemporary Japan, in which 
she sees the potential for a heterotopic counterconduct not predicated on 
progressivist narratives of futurity and home ownership. Vij is persuasive in her 
critique of liberal advocacy on behalf of the homeless in which amelioration is 
offered at the cost of depoliticisation. But when she claims, in a slightly heroic 
vein, that ‘atemporal modes of dwelling prone to seeking nomadic and 
temporary forms of shelter (tarpaulin tents, water tanks, cardboard homes, etc.) 
refuse a domestication of space and a terror of time’,38 I want to ask ‘refuse, or 
are refused?’ Isn’t it conceivable that some migrant workers/homeless people 
would prefer the cold comforts of wage/mortgage slavery within the iron cage of 
chrononormativity (were these possibilities within reach) to the uncertain and 
precarious freedoms of heterotopic dwelling?  
                                                        
37 Paul Apostolidis, ‘Migrant day laborers, the violence of work, and the politics of time’, in Time, 
Temporality and Violence in International Relations, eds. Agathangelou and Killian, 169. 
38 Ritu Vij, ‘Atemporal dwelling: Heterotopias of homelessness in contemporary Japan’, in Time, 
Temporality and Violence in International Relations, eds. Agathangelou and Killian, 174.  
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The slippages in Vij’s argument suggest to me that we are still grappling with a 
question that Fabian poses at the end of his magisterial Time and the Other, 
namely: ‘Are there criteria by which to distinguish denial of coevalness as a 
condition of domination from refusal of coevalness as an act of liberation?’39 (To 
complicate this question further, under what conditions might denial be 
transformed into refusal?) For Fabian, the answer depends on what can be said 
positively about coevalness. If it implies the oneness of Time as identity—‘as, for 
instance, in the idea of one history of salvation or one myth-history of reason’40—
it threatens appropriation, even annihilation. Fabian prefers an understanding of 
coevalness as the common occupation, or sharing, of time.41 This would entail an 
understanding of international relations as the interaction of ‘not the same 
societies at different stages of development, but different societies facing each 
other at the same Time.’42 Such an understanding would not end international 
conflict, but it would force a levelling of the temporal playing field. 
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39 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2014), 154.  
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid., 31.  
42 Ibid., 155.  
